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RECENT DECISIONS
ted others, it was held 13 that the parties excluded the conditions not
specifically mentioned.
Where a particular building is specified in a contract merely for
the sake of convenience and it is in truth immaterial whether or not
the work is to be done there, destruction of that building will not ex-
cuse performance since there was no inherent impossibility of per-
formance in the contract. 14 This does not contravene the doctrine that
destruction of the building or other means of performance which is
necessary by the terms of the contract or within the contemplation of
both parties discharges the duty to perform.' 5
It is well to keep in mind that it is the function of the courts to
interpret contracts and they are loath to make them for individuals.
As has been aptly said "where a person has expressly agreed to do an
act in a contract of his own drawing and neglected to insert a clause
(express condition) saving himself from liability for non-performance,
in case a foreseeable contingency arises the law should not imply a
condition for his own protection which by his own carelessness he
failed to insert in the contract." 16 The court may not inject into a
contract a provision not expressly or by necessary implication included
therein.1
7
R. I. R.
CRIMINAL LAw-CoNSTITUTIONALITY OF NEW YORK'S "ALIBI
STATUTE." I -Section 295-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure pro-
vides, that if a person indicted by a grand jury intends to offer testi-
mony establishing his presence elsewhere than at the scene of the crime
at the time of its commission, he must, when demanded by the prose-
cuting attorney, file a bill of particulars not less than eight days before
'Standard Oil Co. of N. Y. v. Central Dredging Co., 225 App. Div. 407,
233 N. Y. Supp. 279 (3d Dept. 1929); Texas Co. v. Hogarth Shipping Co.,
256 U. S. 619, 41 Sup. Ct. 612 (1921).
" Booth v. Spuyten Duyvil Rolling Mill Co., 60 N. Y. 491 (1875) ; Hefferon
v. Neumond, 198 Mo. App. 667, 201 S. W. 645 (1918).
Stewart v. Stone, 127 N. Y. 500, 28 N. E. 595 (1891).
"WHITNEY, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1934) 260; Amer. Central Ins. Co. of St.
Louis v. McHose, 66 F. (2d) 749 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933); Public Schools of
Trenton v. Bennett, 27 N. J. L. 513 (1859); Krappman Whiting Co. v. Middle-
sex Water Co., 64 N. J. L. 240, 45 Atl. 692 (1900) ; Foley v. Mfg. Fire Ins.
Co., 152 N. Y. 131, 64 N. E. 318 (1897) ; Tompkins v. Dudley, 25 N. Y. 272(1862). In contracts to build entire structures failure to insert a clause reliev-
ing from liability, not only disables contractor from collecting compensation
for a partially erected building which has been destroyed by fire but renders
him liable for damages for non-performance if he fails to replace the building
on time.
'American Central Ins. Co. of St. Louis v. MVfcHose, 66 F. (2d) 749
(C. C. A. 3d, 1933).
'N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 506.
1937 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the trial, setting forth in detail his alleged whereabouts, together with
the names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom he relies to cor-
roborate his allegations. Upon failure to comply, the court may, in
its discretion, exclude such evidence introduced at the trial. In his
motion to vacate and set aside the state's demand for a bill of par-
ticulars, the defendant contends that the aforementioned statute is in
contravention of both the federal and state constitutions,2 which pro-
claim that no person shall be compelled in a criminal action to be a
witness against himself. Held, motion denied. The statute does not
compel the defendant to incriminate himself, but merely stipulates that
if he contemplates interposing an alibi defense, he must first apprise
the district attorney of the salient facts thereof. The People of the
State of New York v. Shade, 161 Misc. 212, 292 N. Y. Supp. 612
(1936).
It is a well established rule that in construing a statute which is
susceptible to two constructions, one of which would render it uncon-
stitutional, it is the duty of the court to apply the construction which
will be in concord with the constitution.8 The defendant's contention
is that Section 295-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is repugnant
to the ancient doctrine "Nemo tenetur prodere seipsirn-nobody is
bound to accuse himself," 4 a principle which has been so jealously
guarded and preserved in our federal and state constitutions. But
the statute does not impair the self-incrimination clause,5 for it does
not compel the defendant to give any information to the district at-
'U. S. CoNsT. Amdt. V.; N. Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 6.
'United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394, 36 Sup. Ct. 658 (1916);
N. Y. Central v. Williams, 199 N. Y. 108, 92 N. E. 404 (1910); People v.
Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 108 N. E. 427 (1915); Mathews v. Mathews, 240 N. Y.
28, 147 N. E. 237 (1925).
'Authorities are in conflict as to the origin of this maxim. One traces it
to the ecclesiastical practice. Wigmore, Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum (1891)
5 HARV. L. REv. 71. ,Another, citing ancient and modern authors, points out
that in no text of canon law is the specific maxim to be found. He also proves
convincingly that in the time of Bacon and Coke torture was employed not
infrequently to force testimony from a defendant, proving that the Common
Law was not the original source of the maxim. Corwin, Self-Incrimlnation
(1930-31) 29 MIcH. L. REv. 1; see also BLOeK, EDWARD CoKE-OR ACLE OF THE
LAW (1929) pp. 192-3. Prof. Corwin, ibid., also mentions Bentham's belief
that the maxim was of Coke's invention, who, in a vehement attack upon the
oath ex officio, stated it in the present form. Coke is said to have delighted in
giving his ideas a Latin phraseology for the sake of apparent sanction of
antiquity. But it seems to me that the maxim has its roots in the ancient
Talmudic Law of more than two thousand years ago, which would take no
cognizance of a defendant's confession unless corroborated by at least two
witnesses, for "No man may acuse himself". Tract Sanhedrin, 9, 25, Yevumoth,
25. See 1 GREENLEAF, EvmiDNcE (15th ed.) 467 for a review of legislation
centering about the doctrine against self-incrimination; see also Note (1935)
10 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 66.
"The earliest statement of the principle against self-incrimination in an
American Constitution is found in § 8 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights
776). THORPE, A~mRcAN CHARTERS, CO STIrTUIOwS, ETC. (1909) ; see also
SJ. ST oims, FEDERAL AND STATE CoNSTITUTIONS (1908) § 136.
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torney, unless he, voluntarily and for his own benefit, intends to in-
terpose an alibi defense. The defendant is not thereby divested of his
right to offer, or to refrain from offering, any defense he deems pro-
pitious to his interests. A condition is merely imposed upon him,
that, in the exercise of such rights, he shall not take undue advantage
of the state, by suddenly flaunting in the face of court and jury fab-
ricated testimony which cannot be readily contradicted. For alibis
are usually very easily proven, but not so easily disproven.
Another prominent feature of constitutionality in the statute is the
provision vesting discretionary power in the court, as to the admissi-
bility of the alibi testimony, in cases where no prior notice was given
by defendant. Where a different defense was contemplated, but ren-
dered unavailable by sudden death of a witness, or the occurrence of
another unforeseen contingency, it need not prove fatal for defendant.
Under such a state of facts, the statute leaves the door open for clem-
ency, by leaving within the discretion of the court the question of the
admission of the alibi evidence, thus averting a possible miscarriage
of justice.6
Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in New York practice, that
the prosecution must be given notice of an intended defense of in-
sanity.7 This, too, is a modification of the common-law rule that every
kind of defense is admissible under a plea Qf not guilty. The same
cry of self-incrimination is applicable to both rules with equal force.
No one, however, is now heard to assail the requirement as to the
plea of insanity, so why not apply the same rule to the alibi defense? 8
The principle of the Fifth Amendment was embodied both in our
state and federal constitutions, as a result of the terrible severity of
the English Penal Code of the Eighteenth Century, and the sufferings
of the Puritans through the oath ex officio.9 Its perpetuation within
'The statute provides: "In all cases where a defendant has been indicted
by a grand jury the prosecuting attorney may, not less than eight days before
the case is moved for trial, serve upon such defendant * * * a demand which
shall require that if such defendant intends to offer * * * testimony which may
tend to establish his presence elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission he must within four days thereafter serve upon such
prosecuting officer a bill of particulars which shall set forth in detail the place
or places where the defendant claims to have been, together with the names,
post office addresses, residences, and places of employment of the witnesses
upon whom he intends to rely to establish his presence elsewhere than at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Unless the defendant shall
* * * serve and file such bill of particulars, the court * * * may exclude such
testimony, or the testimony of such witnesses. In the event that the court shall
allow such testimony, * * * it must, upon motion of the prosecuting officer,
grant an adjournment not to exceed three days."
As the state, in the indictment, gives the accused reasonable notice of all
the charges he will meet, and thus gives him ample time to prepare any defense
he pleases, then why not give the state the same advantage?
'See JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY, Vol. 3, p. 890, Vol. 4,
p. 67 (1911).
'CORWIN, op. cit. mspra note 4; see also MILLAPR, The Modernization of
Criminal Procedure, 2 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY (1920).
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our legal system was actuated by lofty ideals of justice and ethics. But
at no time was it intended as a shrine of worship for our super-
criminals. To exculpate a murderer because of a legal technicality, is
at best a ludicrous anomaly. Such practice will undermine our sys-
tem of jurisprudence, and relegate it to the fate of sophism in ancient
Greece. The ideal of justice is the search for human truth. The ulti-
mate inquiry in every criminal proceeding should be whether the ac-
cused is innocent or guilty and not whether all the requirements of the
legal formulae are met with mathematical precision. If we are to dam
the flood of twentieth century crime, with its scientific efficiency, we
must recast and reform our Criminal Code,10 so as to weed out what-
ever 1 1 impedes the successful administration of justice. The assailed
statute is a stride forward in our state's battle against intrenched crim-
inality. It will close a main avenue of escape to the guilty, and will
reduce the voluminous amount of perjury prevalent in our courts as
a direct consequence of the dilatory plea of alibi. It would seem to
follow that the contention that the statute is in contravention of the
principle against incrimination, is nebulous and unfounded.12
A. F.
CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER IN FIRST DEGREE-INSANITY AS A
DEFENSE-RECOMMENDATION FOR MERCY BY JURY.-Defendant, a
woman, overcome by economic hardship, drowned her infant son,
believing that by this act she could free him from the suffering that
might otherwise be his lot. She was indicted for murder in the first
degree. The defense was tempory insanity.' The trial judge charged
"POUND, Program of Procedural Reform, PROCEEDINGS OF ILLINOIS STATE
BAR ASSOCIATION FOR 1910, p. 395; Report of Committee E of the Am. Institute
of Criminal Law and Criminology, 1 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMI-
NOLOGY, 587.
' See 3 WARTON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (10th ed. 1918) citing cases which
hold it error for a judge to say without qualification, that an alibi is a defense
which should be offered at the preliminary hearing, and that it should be
regarded with suspicion.
" This measure, one of the significant landmarks in New York's fight for
a more effective prosecution of the criminal, was originally drawn by the
Committee on Criminal Courts and Procedure of the N. Y. County Lawyer's
Association, for the American Bar Association. It was introduced in the New
York Legislature as early as 1931, but was not passed until 1935. Its enactment
was undoubtedly influenced by the similar statutes of Michigan, Ohio, and
New Jersey, which were enacted in 1927, 1929, and 1934, respectively. See
People v. Miller, 250 Mich. 72. 229 N. W. 475 (1930); People v. Marcus, 253
Mich. 410, 235 N. W. 202 (1931) ; Reed v. State, 44 Ohio App. 318, 185 N. E.
558 (1933). In the above jurisdictions, the constitutionality of the alibi statutes
was either expressly decided upon, or its validity assumed. -
11 BIsHoP, CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed. 1923) § 381. "Insanity in the criminal
law is any defect, weakness or disease of the mind rendering it incapable of
[ VOL. 11
